Let N be a …nite set. By a closure space we mean the family of the closed sets of a closure operator on 2 N satisfying the additional condition ; = ;. A simple game on a closure space L is a function v : L ! f0; 1g such that v(;) = 0 and v (N ) = 1. We assume simple games are monotonic. The coalitions are the closed sets of L and the players are the elements i 2 N . We will give results concerning the structure of the core and the Weber set for this type of games. We show that a simple game is supermodular if and only if the game is a unanimity game and the Core (L; v) is a stable set if and only if the game v is a unanimity game.
Introduction
Cooperative game theory has been used to analyze the relative power of players in voting schemes. The …rst such power index was proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954) . An assumption of the classical model is that all coalitions of voters are feasible. However, structural and ideological issues will prevent some coalitions from forming. There have been various investigations into models of cooperative games that also re ‡ect constraints on coalition formation. See, for instance Faigle and Kern (1992) (1998) , Derks and Gilles (1995) or Brink and Gilles (1996) . We will restrict the feasible coalitions by using closure spaces, that is, set systems containing the set of all players and closed under intersection of coalitions. We also need convex geometries which are closure spaces with the extension property. The theory of these combinatorial structures is well covered by Edelman and Jamison (1985) and Korte, Lovász and Schrader (1991) . The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, closure spaces and convex geometries are de…ned and some of their properties described. Furthermore, simple games on these set systems are introduced. In sections 3 and 4, we obtain general theorems on the core and Weber set in our framework.
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Games on closure spaces
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a …nite set. By a closure operator ¡ : 2 N ! 2 N we mean an operator satisfying the axioms: Examples of closure operators are the spanning operator of linear algebra and all convex hull operators. A set S 2 2 N is said to be closed if S = S. The family of the closed sets of a closure operator is a closure space.
Alternatively, a family L µ 2 N satisfying that ;; N 2 L, and S \ T 2 L for all S; T 2 L, de…nes an operator ¡ : 2 N ! 2 N by
This operator is a closure operator and the family L is a closure space. A closure space L µ 2 N is atomic if fig 2 L for all i 2 N: If L µ 2 N is a closure space, then it is a complete lattice, ordered by inclusion, in which meet and join operations are de…ned by A^B = A \ B; A _ B = A [ B; for all A; B 2 L. De…nition 2.1. A closure space L is a convex geometry if it satis…es the extension property: If A 2 L and A 6 = N; then there exists j 2 N n A such that A [ fjg 2 L.
The closed sets in a convex geometry are called convex sets. For A µ N an element a 2 A is an extreme point of A if a = 2 A n a: For a closed set A 2 L this is equivalent to A n a 2 L. Let ex(A) be the set of all extreme points of A. Moreover, convex geometries are the abstract closure spaces satisfying the …nite Minkowski-Krein-Milman property: Every closed set is the closure of its extreme points.
A cooperative game is a function v : 2 N ! R with v(;) = 0: The players are the elements of N and the coalitions are the elements S µ N of the boolean algebra 2 N : In this paper, we will de…ne games on closure spaces, taking into account communication restrictions that may cause de…ciencies in the cooperation among some players. De…nition 2.2. A game on a closure space L µ 2 N is a real function v : L ! R such that v(;) = 0. The coalitions are the elements of the family L and the players are the elements i 2 N. By ¡(L) we denote the vector space of all games on L.
We will introduce several examples in the context of cooperative games with restricted cooperation.
is a game and G = (N; E) is a graph. This concept was …rst introduced in Myerson (1977) and investigated in Borm, Owen and Tijs (1992) . If G = (N; E) is a connected block graph, then the family of all coalitions of N that induce connected subgraphs, denoted by L = fS µ N : (S; E(S)) is connectedg; is a closure space, and also a convex geometry.
Example. Let (P; ·) be a …nite partially ordered set (poset). For any X µ P; X 7 ! X := fy 2 P : y · x for some x 2 Xg ; de…nes a closure operator on P . Its closed sets are the order ideals of P , and we denote this lattice J(P ). Since the union and intersection of order ideals is again an order ideal, it follows that J(P ) is a sublattice of 2 P . Then J(P ) is a distributive lattice and so, J(P ) is a convex geometry closed under set-union and ex(S) is the set of all maximal points Max(S) of the subposet S 2 J(P ). There is a 1-1 correspondence between antichains of P and order ideals.
For this reason the games (L; v) and (A; c) of Kern (1992) (1998) , where L = J(P ) is the family of order ideals of P and A is the set of antichains of a rooted forest, are games on distributive lattices.
Example. We consider the following political game. Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be voters and R d be an d-dimensional issue space. We will denote by x i the ideal point of the voter i in this space. Let u : R d ! R be a convex function such that u(x) = u(¡x). If y 2 R d we will let u i (y) = u(y ¡ x i ) be the utility of the outcome y to voter i. Assume that each voter i will vote in favor of an outcome y if u i (y) > ² y . Suppose that every voter i 2 A µ N will vote in favor of y and that for some j = 2 A we have that x j is in the convex hull of fx i : i 2 Ag. It follows from the convexity of the function u that u j (y) > ² y and hence j will vote in favor of y as well. Thus coalitions A µ N that form in this model have the property that x j in the convex hull of fx i : i 2 Ag implies that j 2 A. Since we do not know very much about the function u or the threshold values ² y , it would be reasonable to assume that all coalitions with this closure property might form. This collection of subsets is a Euclidean convex geometry (see Example 1 in Edelman and Jamison, 1985) .
We introduce two types of supermodularity for games de…ned on a closure space L µ 2 N . In the …rst one we use the binary operations join _ and meet^:
Note that every supermodular game is quasi-supermodular.
A game v 2 ¡ (L) is simple if v (S) 2 f0; 1g for each coalition S 2 L and v (N) = 1. We assume simple games are monotonic, i.e., for any S; T 2 L such that
and it is called a minimal winning coalition when v(T ) = 0 for any T 2 L such that T $ S. For a simple game we denote by W the family of its minimal winning coalitions.
A player i 2 N is called a veto player in a simple game v 2 ¡ (L) if i belongs to each winning coalition S 2 L. We denote by V the set of veto players in the game v 2 ¡ (L), i.e.,
A simple game is called weak if it has at least one veto player, that is V 6 = ;: Note that if there exist i; j 2 N; i 6 = j such that
We consider the following simple games. For any T 2 L; T 6 = ;; the unanimity game ³ T : L ! R, is de…ned by
Notice that the game ³ T is the unique simple game in which a coalition is winning if it includes all members of T , i.e., coalition T is decisive. Gilboa and Lehrer (1991) 3 The Weber set and the core in simple games For each S 2 L and x 2 R n ; we de…ne x(S) = P i2S x i ; x(;) = 0: The imputation set and the core of a game v 2 ¡ (L) are given by the following polyhedrons
If we denote by fe i g n i=1 the vectors of the canonical basis of R n ; then there are three possibilities for the imputation set I (L; v) of a simple game on an atomic closure space L µ 2 N . We consider now some results concerning the structure of the core for this type of games.
Theorem 3.1. Let L µ 2 N be an atomic closure space, and v 2 ¡ (L) a simple game. Then v is weak if and only if Core (L; v) 6 = ;. Furthermore,
Proof. Suppose that V 6 = ;; and let e i 2 R n where i 2 V: Then, e i (N) = 1 = v (N) and e i (S)¸v (S) for all S 2 L; and therefore e i 2 Core (L; v) :
Conversely, if Core (L; v) is nonempty, then there exists x 6 = 0; and the atomicity of L implies that x¸0: Further, P i2S x i = 1; for all S 2 W: We show, by contradiction, that V 6 = ;: Assume that the set of veto players is empty. Then we can take the sum of the equations P i2S x i = 1 for all S 2 W; and we obtain ® 1 x 1 + ¢ ¢ ¢ + ® n x n = jWj ; with ® j < jWj for all 1 · j · n: Therefore, (jWj ¡ ® 1 ) x 1 + ¢ ¢ ¢ + (jWj ¡ ® n ) x n = 0; and this gives a contradiction.
Corollary 3.1. Let L µ 2 N be an atomic closure space, and v 2 ¡ (L) a simple game. If v is weak, then
In the framework of games on convex geometries, the formation of the grand coalition N can be modeled as a sequential process by using the extension property. Each one of these sequential orders can to be identi…ed with the following concept.
A compatible ordering of the convex geometry L is a total ordering of the elements of N, i 1 < i 2 < ¢ ¢ ¢ < i n such that the sets fi 1 ; i 2 ; : : : ; i j g 2 L; for all 1 · j · n:
A compatible ordering of L corresponds exactly to a maximal chain in L. We will denote the set of all the maximal chains of L by C (L). Given an element i 2 N and a maximal chain C, the set
is the coalition of L constructed by the player i and his predecessors in the chain C. Note that i 2 ex (C(i)) by using the de…nition of extreme point in the previous section.
De…nition 3.1. Let L µ 2 N be a convex geometry. The marginal worth vector a C 2 R n with respect to the chain C 2 C (L) in the game v 2 ¡ (L) is given by
The Weber set of a game v is the convex hull of the marginal worth vectors,
It is easy to prove that a C (S) = v (S) for all S 2 C:
Proposition 3.1. Let L µ 2 N be a convex geometry and let v 2 ¡ (L) be a simple game. If fS 1 ; : : : ; S r g is the set of its minimal winning coalitions, then
Proof. Let C 2 C (L) be a maximal chain and we consider the marginal worth vector a C : For all i 2 N we obtain a C i = v (C (i)) ¡ v (C (i) n i)0 since v is a monotonic game. Moreover a C (N) = v (N) = 1: Hence, a C 2 R n is a vector with only one of its components equal to 1 and the rest of them equal to 0. Assume that the component j is equal to 1, i.e., v (C (j)) = 1 and v (C (j) n j) = 0: Then a C = e j : On the other hand, C (j) is a winning coalition and therefore there exists a minimal winning coalition S k such that S k µ C (j) : Note that j 2 S k since if j = 2 S k then S k µ C (j) n j and so C (j) n j is a winning coalition but v (C (j) n j) = 0: Moreover, by the de…nition of extreme point, we have that j 2 ex (S k ) since
In order to prove the reverse inclusion, if i 2 S r k=1 ex (S k ) ; then there exists a minimal winning coalition S k such that i 2 ex (S k ) : Let C 2 C (L) be the maximal chain such that S k = C (i) : The marginal worth vector for this chain satis…es a C = e i : 2
Bilbao, Lebrón and Jiménez (1999) showed the following result: A game v 2 ¡ (L) on a convex geometry L is quasi-supermodular if and only if W eber (L; v) µ Core (L; v) : Proposition 3.2. Let L µ 2 N be a convex geometry and let v 2 ¡ (L) be a simple game. The following statements are equivalent:
1. The game v is quasi-supermodular.
2. The game v is a unanimity game.
3. The game v is supermodular.
Proof. (2) ) (1) We show that unanimity games are quasi-supermodular games. For T 2 L; T 6 = ;; if we consider the game ³ T ; we distinguish the following cases: 
But it is impossible since the game v is supermodular. Thus, there is only one coalition for which the minimum is attained. It is clear that
Hence v (A) = 0 and v = ³ T :
(1) ) (3) It follows from theorem 6 in Bilbao et al. (1999) that every monotonic quasi-supermodular game is a supermodular game. 2
Remark 3.1. When L is a closure space, but not a convex geometry, only the equivalence (2) () (3) is true.
The unanimity games on atomic convex geometries are weak games. If we consider the unanimity game v = ³ T ; T 6 = ;; T 2 L, then we obtain:
We next de…ne the concept of dummy player. We will show that each imputation that satis…es the dummy axiom is an element of the Weber set.
De…nition 3.3. A nonempty set J µ R n satis…es the dummy player property when for all i 2 N such that i is a dummy player in a game v and for all x 2 J; then
Theorem 3.2. Let L µ 2 N be an atomic convex geometry and let v 2 ¡ (L) be a simple game. If J µ I (L; v) satis…es the dummy player property then J µ W eber (L; v) : The converse is true when I (L; v) = conv fe 1 ; : : : ; e n g :
Proof. First, we prove that if J satis…es the dummy player property, then it is contained in the Weber set. If I (L; v) = fe i g the result follows easily. Thus, we assume that I (L; v) = conv fe 1 ; : : : ; e n g, i.e., there is no winning coalition T 2 L such that jT j = 1 and so, v (fig) = 0 for all i 2 N: If x 2 J, then x 2 conv fe 1 ; : : : ; e n g and so, x = P n i=1 ¹ i e i with ¹ i¸0 for i = 1; : : : ; n and
In this case, there would be a minimal winning coalition S j µ S with k 2 S j , because if S j µ S n k we would obtain v (S n k) = 1; which is not possible. Therefore, k is a dummy player in v and so, ¹ k = x k = v (fkg) = 0:
Conversely, let v be a simple game such that I (L; v) = conv fe 1 ; : : : ; e n g and let J µ W eber (L; v) :
Other solution concepts in simple games Faigle and Kern (1992) introduced the hierarchical strength h S (i) in distributive lattices L as follows.
The hierarchical strength h S (i) is the average number of compatible orderings of L in which i is the last member of S in the ordering. Note that h S (i) satis…es h S (i) 6 = 0 if and only if i 2 ex(S):
For games on distributive lattices, Faigle and Kern (1992) showed that the Shapley value is the unique operator © : ¡(L) ! R n ; v 7 ! (© 1 (v); : : : ; © n (v)) ; which satis…es the following axioms:
(A1) (Linearity) For all ®;¯2 R, and v; w 2 ¡(L) we have
(A3) (Hierarchical strength) For any S 2 L and i; j 2 S;
Moreover, they obtained the formula
(4.1) for all i 2 N; where c (N) is the number of maximal chains in L.
Bilbao and Edelman (2000) extended (4.1) for games on convex geometries. We observe next that
Theorem 4.1. Let L µ 2 N be an atomic convex geometry. A simple game v 2 ¡ (L) is a unanimity game if and only if © (v) 2 Core (L; v) :
It follows from corollary (3.1) and proposition (3.1) that there exists a player
For this i, we have © i (v) = 0 and © i (v) 6 = 0 but it is impossible.
The converse follows from © (v) 2 W eber (L; v) µ Core (L; v) ; where the inclusion holds for quasi-supermodular games.
2
Now we introduce the notion of dominance between imputations and the concept of stable set.
De…nition 4.1. Let v 2 ¡ (L) and x; y 2 I(L; v): The imputation x dominates the imputation y (we denote x dom y) if there exists a nonempty S 2 L such that x i > y i for all i 2 S, and x(S) · v(S): De…nition 4.2. Let I(L; v) 6 = ;: A set E µ I(L; v) is stable if the imputations in E are undominated by other elements of E, and every imputation not in E is dominated by an imputation in E: Theorem 4.2. Let L µ 2 N be an atomic convex geometry and let v 2 ¡ (L) be a simple game. The Core (L; v) is a stable set if and only if the game v is a unanimity game.
Proof. If Core (L; v) is a stable set, then it must be nonempty and we can now apply corollary 3.1 to obtain Core (L; v) = conv where fS 1 ; : : : ; S r g is the set of minimal winning coalition with the ordering jS 1 j · jS 2 j · : : : · jS r j. We next consider two cases:
(1) If jS 1 j = 1 or jS 1 j = n; then v = ³ S 1 .
(2) If 1 < jS 1 j < n, and assume that W eber (L; v) * Core (L; v) ; i.e. v is not a unanimity game, then there exists k 2 S r j=1 ex (S j ) n T r j=1 S j and so e k = 2 Core (L; v) : As Core (L; v) is a stable set, there exists x 2 Core (L; v) such that x dom e k using a coalition T 2 L. Since x (T ) = v (T ) ; x i > 0 for all i 2 T; i 6 = k; and x k > 1 if k 2 T; there must be v (T ) = 1 and k = 2 T: Thus, there exists a minimal winning coalition S j ¤ 2 L such that S j ¤ µ T and x (S j ¤ ) = v (S j ¤ ) = 1: Then, we infer that x i > 0 for all i 2 S j ¤ and since x (N n S j ¤ ) = 0; it implies that x (S p n S j ¤ ) = 0 for every minimal winning coalition S p 2 L; S p 6 = S j ¤ : However, we have that x 2 Core (L; v) ; x (S p ) = 1 holds and hence x (S p \ S j ¤ ) = 1 for every minimal winning coalition S p 2 L. Then, we assert that S j ¤ µ T r j=1 S j . Assume not, there exists a minimal winning coalition S p 2 L such that S j ¤ * S p and we should have that x (N) = x (S j ¤ \ S p ) + x (S j ¤ n S p ) + : : : > 1; but it is impossible. Therefore, T r j=1 S j = S j ¤ and hence v = ³ S j ¤ : Conversely, let v = ³ T be a unanimity game. When jT j = 1 or jT j = n, the Core (L; v) = I (L; v) and so it is stable. Assume that 1 < jT j < n, and Core (L; v) 6 = I (L; v) : For every x 2 I (L; v) n Core (L; v) we can take y 2 Core (L; v) ; de…ned by
Thus y dom x using coalition T , and the core is a stable set.
